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ABSTRACT  
We present a new framework (and its mechanisms) of a Continuous Monitoring System (CMS) having 
new improved capabilities, and discuss its requirements and implications. The CMS is based on the real-
time actual configuration of the system and the environment rather than a theoretic or assumed 
configuration. Moreover, the CMS predicts organizational damages taking into account chains of impacts 
among systems' components generated by messaging among software components. In addition, the CMS 
takes into account all organizational effects of an attack. Its risk measurement takes into account the 
consequences of a threat, as defines in risk analysis standards. Loss prediction is based on a neural 
network algorithm with learning and improving capabilities, rather than a fixed algorithm which typically 
lacks the necessary environmental dynamic updates. Framework presentation includes systems design, 
neural network architecture design, and an example of the detailed network architecture. 
Keywords: Continuous Monitoring, Computer security, Attack graph, Software vulnerability, Risk 
management, Impact propagation, Cyber attack, Configuration management 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Personal and organizational computing systems 
are sometimes subject to cyber-attacks which 
may cause damage to organizational data, 
software and computers (Mell et al. 2007). This 
paper focuses on threats generated by hostile 
attackers. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses or 
exposures stemming from bugs that are potential 
causes to security failures: loss of 
confidentiality, integrity or availability. An 
attack is performed by exploiting software 
vulnerabilities in the target computing system. 
Exploits are planned to attack certain 
components having specific vulnerabilities. 
Langer (2011) states that Stuxnet warm included 
a process of checking hardware models and 
configuration details, and also downloads 
program code from the controller to check if it 
was the “right” program before launching an 
attack. This leads to planning defense systems 
that are sensitive to changes in their 
environment. Users' computers might be 
damaged by exploited vulnerabilities. 
Organizations make decisions on actions they 
have to take, in order to limit their risks 
according to the amount of potential damage and 
vulnerability characteristics (Tom, 2008). 
Several software products are usually used for 
defending computers from cyber attacks. 
Antivirus software, antispyware and firewalls 
are examples to some of these tools. Several 
tools are based on periodic assessment of the 
target computer by comparing computers' 
software to the known published vulnerabilities. 
Antivirus engines store features of known 
malware and hash signatures, using 
classification algorithms to identify hostile 
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software. Signature scanning technique is the 
most widely used technology in anti-virus 
programs (Symantec, 1997). Those tools are 
naturally effective only against known threats 
and not against new unpublished threats. 
Heuristic Antivirus scanners detect viruses by 
analyzing the program’s structure or its behavior 
instead of looking for signatures. Heuristic 
scanners are able to identify new unpublished 
malware. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
monitor the events occurring in a computer or 
network, searching for violations or threats to 
computer security policies and security 
practices. Static and dynamic code analysis 
techniques are aimed to identify malicious 
activities by analyzing attempts to execute code 
or identifying unusual behavior (Scarfone and 
Mell, 2007). Contrary to the popular techniques 
such as antivirus, antispyware and firewall, our 
model analyzes vulnerabilities at the time before 
fixes are publicly distributed. Moreover, our 
model uses a prediction algorithm which uses 
historical data of exploits, together with 
computer's configuration, to predict losses of the 
new vulnerabilities.  
Information Security Continuous Monitoring 
system (ISCM) is defined by NIST as: 
Maintaining ongoing awareness of information 
security, vulnerabilities, and threats to support 
organizational risk management decisions 
(Dempsey et al., 2011). We use the acronym 
CMS since we do not limit our model to 
software. CMS's monitor computer systems in a 
near real time process aimed at detecting 
vulnerabilities and cyberspace security risks, and 
alarming the appropriate functions within the 
organization. Contemporary systems use 
vulnerabilities databases (which are continually 
updated as new vulnerabilities are detected) and 
a scoring algorithm which predicts potential 
business losses.  
Computers are at risk to known threats until the 
moment a patch is programmed for the 
vulnerable specific software, an activity that 
may last weeks or months. Even after a patch is 
prepared by the software vendor a computer 
might still be at risk until the moment the new 
patch is loaded to the vulnerable system. 
Loading patches to computer systems is usually 
performed as a periodic process, not 
continuously. The reason for this is avoiding too 
many interrupts required for uploading and 
activating the patch on the production 
environment. In today's environment of zero-day 
exploits, conventional systems updating for 
security vulnerabilities has become a 
cumbersome process. There is an urgent need 
for a solution that can rapidly assess system 
vulnerabilities and immediately fix them (Nũez, 
2008). Although zero-day vulnerabilities are 
kept secret by hackers for exploits programming, 
after a 90-days period vendors like Google use 
to automatically disclose the vulnerability to the 
public even if no fix was written. Our system 
deals with risks at the time the vulnerability is 
published but not yet fixed in the operational 
organizational environment. 
Operating techniques for monitoring, detecting 
and alerting of security threats on a regular basis 
are defined as Security Continuous Monitoring 
(SCM) systems. After identifying these risks, 
tools evaluate the potential impacts on the 
organization, sometimes suggesting risk 
mitigation activities to the organization to 
support organizational risk management 
decisions (Dempsey, 2011). SCM's are aimed at 
closing the gap between the zero-day of 
identifying the vulnerability, until the moment 
the computer is loaded by the corresponding 
patch fixing the vulnerability. The time gap may 
be considerably long.  
In this paper we describe a mechanism of a new 
SCM system framework that will produce better 
detection and prevention than existing SCM 
systems. Our framework is based on four main 
elements: (1) Knowledge concerning the specific 
computers' configuration of the target system 
and interrelationships among systems' 
components. (2) A prediction algorithm which 
runs continuously and predicts the potential 
losses. (3) Risk assessment is based on 
vulnerability consequences. (4) A learning 
algorithm which continuously improves the 
predicted losses.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In 
section 2 we describe current known solutions. 
In section 3 we present the proposed framework 
including systems' architecture. In section 4 we 
describe the scoring algorithm which predicts 
vulnerability losses. We present a neural 
network model for loss prediction and learning. 
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In section 5 we conclude and describe future 
research directions.    
 
2. EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
 
SCM systems are using external vulnerabilities 
databases for evaluation of the target computers' 
risk. There are several owners of vulnerability 
databases (Dempsey et al., 2011): The Sans 
Internet Storm Center services and The National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD). Vulnerability 
Identification Systems (VIS) aimed to identify 
vulnerabilities according to three categories: 
code, design, or architecture. Examples for VIS 
are: the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
(CVE), and The Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE). In this work we shall use 
NVD vulnerabilities database as an example. 
 
Risk evaluation uses scoring systems which 
enable parameters estimation for assessing the 
impacts of vulnerabilities on the organization. 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS) is a framework that enables user 
organizations receive IT vulnerabilities 
characteristics (Mell et al., 2007).  
CVSS uses three groups of parameters to score 
potential risks:  Basic parameters, Temporal 
parameters and Environmental parameters. Each 
group is represented by a score compound 
parameters ordered as a vector, used to compute 
the score. Basic parameters represent the 
intrinsic specifications of the vulnerability. 
Temporal parameters represent the specifications 
of a vulnerability that might change over time 
due to technical changes. Environmental 
parameters represent the specifications of 
vulnerabilities derived from the local IT specific 
environment used by users' organization. CVSS 
enables omitting the environmental metrics from 
score calculations, those are cases that users' 
environment has no effect on the score. CVSS is 
a common framework for characterizing 
vulnerabilities and predicting risks, used by IT 
managers, risk managers, researchers and IT 
vendors, for several aspects of risk management.  
 
CVSS is an open framework which enables 
managers to deal with organizations' risks and 
make decisions based on facts rather than 
evaluations. User organizations adopting CVSS 
framework may gain the following benefits: 
• A standard scale for scoring vulnerabilities 
and risks. The scale enables organizations 
normalize vulnerabilities according to 
specific IT platforms. The computed scores 
enable users to get rational decisions in 
correlation to vulnerability risks.  
• Open framework: user organization can see 
the characteristics of vulnerability and the 
logical process of scores evaluation.  
• Prioritized risks: organizations using the 
environmental parameters may benefit by 
considering changes in its IT environment 
according to predicted risk scores. 
There are few other vulnerability scoring 
systems besides CVSS differing by what they 
measure. CERT/CC puts an emphasis on 
Internet infrastructure risks. SANS vulnerability 
system considers users' IT configuration and 
usage of default parameter definitions. 
Microsoft’s scoring system emphasizes attack 
vectors and impacts of the vulnerability. 
Generally, Basic and Temporal parameters are 
specified and published by products' vendors 
who have the best knowledge of their product. 
Environmental parameters are specified by the 
users who have the best knowledge of their 
environments and vulnerabilities' business 
impacts.  
 
This paper focuses mainly on environmental 
metrics. 
 
The organizational damage caused by 
vulnerability is influenced by the specific IT 
environment which is exploited. CVSS 
environmental parameters specify the 
characteristics of a vulnerability that is 
associated with user’s IT components 
compounding the environment. Environmental 
parameters are of three groups: 
I. Collateral Damage Potential (CDP): 
A group of parameters which measure the 
economic potential loss caused by a 
vulnerability.  
II. Target Distribution (TD): 
Parameters indicating the percentage of 
vulnerable components in user environment. 
A large proportion indicates more impacts 
on organizational potential damages. 
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III. Security Requirements (CR, IR, AR):  
Security requirements are parameters which 
indicate user's sensitivity to security risks. 
This group of parameters is subdivided to certain 
parameters indicating the Confidentiality (CR), 
Integrity (IR), and Availability (AR) of the 
vulnerable component. High security 
requirements might cause higher security 
damages, thus more economic losses.  
 
Categorization of IT components according to 
security requirement measures should be 
performed by users encompassing all assets. 
Doing so raises the possibility to predict the 
organizational losses. Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) requirements 
demands implementation of a categorization 
system (Dempsey et al., 2011), but does not 
require using any particular scale, thus risk 
comparisons among users systems is difficult. 
 
3. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
Federal organizations are moving from periodic 
to continuous monitoring implementing SCM's 
which will improve national cyber security 
posture (Hardy, 2012). The proposed framework 
includes four capabilities which are not found in 
current models: 
 
• Real time environmental metrics.  
Metric evaluations are based on the components 
of the system as updated in the systems' CMDB 
(Keller and Subramanianm, 2009). There are 
several commercial products for asset inventory 
management such as IBM Tivoli or Microsoft 
System center. This capability enables basing 
predictions on real IT environment rather than 
on user's evaluations. According to Grimalia et 
al. (2009) it is impossible for organizations to 
make precise estimates of the economic losses 
caused by an attack without having full 
knowledge of users' IT environment.  Kotenko 
and Chechulin (2012) state that network 
configuration should be monitored continually 
and available vulnerabilities must be analyzed in 
order to provide the necessary security level.  
The proposed CMS examines a database of 
published asset vulnerabilities, compares in real 
time computers' assets for existing exposures, 
and calculates computers' potential losses. Loss 
evaluation is performed by considering 
vulnerabilities even before patches are prepared 
and loaded on the computers' system. 
 
• Components interdependencies. 
Current systems focus on the IT infrastructure 
but not on the interdependencies among 
components. Several researchers stress the need 
to deal with interdependencies (Albanese et al., 
2013; Jakobson, 2011). Jajodia S, et al. (2011) 
presents a model that maps possible multi-step 
environmental vulnerabilities, enabling 
organizational damage estimations. Kotenko and 
Chechulin (2012) present a system based on 
attack modeling using attack graphs, evaluating 
security risk based on attack model. Wang et al. 
(2006) propose an automated process aimed at 
hardening a network against multi-step 
intrusions. 
Our framework deals with loss prediction by 
looking for past attacks on systems' components 
by learning from their past organizational 
impacts. The proposed algorithm takes into 
account component dependencies, predicting all 
potential direct and indirect impacts on the 
organization stemming from the specific 
vulnerable component. Loss prediction is 
implemented by a neural network which 
represents IT components and interdependencies 
between components such as reading and 
writing from neighboring components. The 
process of predicting loss is based on 
propagation of signals among components, 
starting from the vulnerable component, ending 
at the organizational losses as stated by the user. 
Signals between components represent the 
varying kinds of dependencies. 
 
• Risk assessment based on consequences. 
Risk analysis theory defines risk as a triple that 
specifies the scenario of an event, the likelihood 
that the occurring event and event consequences 
appearing regularly as threat x vulnerability x 
consequences. According to Collier et al. (2014) 
CVSS fails to connect risk assessment to risk 
management. According to CVSS, risk damage 
potential values are estimated by organizations 
(Mell et al., 2007). According to the proposed 
framework, potential loss prediction is based on 
the actual losses of similar past attacks on the 
specific vulnerable component, performed 
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through the similar attack vector. In cases when 
there has not been in the past a similar attack, 
prediction will be based on past losses stemming 
from past attacks on the specific component 
concerning all attack vectors.   
 
• A Learning algorithm. 
Hardy (2012) states that predictive analysis 
should be used for threat modeling. Threat 
projection algorithms are also presented by 
Holsopple and Yang (2008) to estimate plausible 
futures. We use predictive analysis for loss 
prediction, based on historical data of losses 
caused by past attacks on vulnerable 
components. The predictive analysis uses a 
learning algorithm since the organization learns 
how to deal with the vulnerable component, 
improves its software, thus limiting or 
preventing damages. According to the proposed 
framework loss prediction is based on 
environmental parameters, and actual losses of 
past events. Both environmental parameters and 
losses are related to changes: environmental 
characteristics are subject to changes which 
occur all the time in operational systems and 
actual losses of past events which are 
continuously updated according to users' 
findings about incidents' impacts. Losses caused 
by past attacks may be noticed long after the 
time of the attack. Such late losses should update 
the predicted loss calculated by the algorithm.   
We describe the proposed framework 
architecture (Figure 1) and its main components.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Continuous Monitoring System architecture 
 
Vulnerabilities Database includes all known 
vulnerabilities and their specification as 
published by Database owners or government 
agencies. As an example for vulnerability 
specifications NVD defines: category, vendor 
name, product name, published start and end 
dates, vulnerability update dates, severity, access 
vector, access complexity and security 
requirements of a patch (Hardy, 2012). 
 
Scoring module (CVSS) is an algorithm which 
computes potential losses according to the 
parameters of three groups. As stated above 
there are also other known algorithms, some of 
them for public use other commercial. 
 
CMDB is a database which includes all 
hardware and software components of the target 
system and all components' characteristics. 
Components are dealt in a resolution of a 
hardware machine. Software is dealt in the 
resolution of programs or physical exe files or 
DLL's. Data is handled in the resolution of 
database or table, not data items. Input/output 
are dealt by screen-name or output message. The 
target system might be one computer or a group 
of organizations' computers. CMDB includes all 
components in the computers' environment, 
components which interface with the target 
system directly or indirectly up to external and 
end-users' interfaces. CMDB includes also the 
security requirements (CR, IR, AR) of each 
component. Security requirements are specified 
by systems' owners according to business 
potential losses. CMDB includes also all 
interfaces among components. For each interface 
Vulnerabilities 
Database (NVD) 
CMDB 
Historical Events Database: 
Potential Vulnerabilities, 
Losses, IT Components 
 
Potential Losses 
Database 
 
CMS  
Learning 
Module 
Scoring 
Module 
(CVSS) 
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are indicated the direction of data transfer 
between the components and the probability of 
occurrence of that connection according to 
systems' operational history.  
 
Historical events database includes all cyber 
attacks on the system and their details. For each 
event indicated the vulnerability which was used 
to exploit and all computer components involved 
in the incident. Also are indicated the economic 
loss caused to the organization by the attack as 
evaluated by the organizational users or risk 
management.  
 
Potential Losses Database includes the predicted 
losses computed by the system. Systems' owner 
is informed about the potential predicted loss of 
all components at risks and makes his decisions 
concerning each component. The owner might 
disable a component or a computer when loss 
potential is high. In cases a patch is not yet 
developed, the owner might continue using the 
risky component or monitoring the component 
closely with higher awareness to possible 
exploits. In cases a patch was developed but not 
yet loaded on operational systems the owner 
might decide either remediate and deploy the 
patch, defer deployment to appropriate times 
considering organizational constraints, or reject 
deployment in cases the potential loss is limited.  
 
The system runs continuously based on the 
neural network predicting losses of new 
vulnerabilities. Updates to neural networks' 
parameters due to the learning process are 
performed periodically according to operational 
constraints.  
The system start the continuous process 
computing loss prediction in two cases: first is 
whenever a new vulnerability is publishes and 
indicated in the NVD. Second is whenever a 
change is made or intended to be made in a 
system component or in systems' environment. 
In the case of testing a new component, the 
system computes losses as a simulation, before 
decision is made to move the component to the 
operational environment. Loss evaluation is 
based on NVD, CVSS, CMDB and the 
Historical Events Database. Whenever a 
component is found to be vulnerable according 
to NVD, the system performs a propagation 
process which computes all impacts on 
components which read or write data from the 
vulnerable component. Propagation algorithm 
runs until the final output is been transferred to 
the users or written to the output files. 
Propagation process uses CMDB to lead the 
process of interactions among components. The 
Learning algorithm writes the potential 
computed losses in the Historical Events 
Database. The Learning module forecasts the 
future potential losses caused by a specific 
vulnerability which was exploited on a 
component. Prediction will performed by 
running the neural network. Actual damage will 
be updated by organizations' owner on a regular 
basis to capture also delayed outcomes of a past 
vulnerability. The learning algorithm will 
improve economic prediction accuracy losses 
which will be based on the updated environment 
and the updated actual losses.    
     
4. LOSS SCORING AND LEARNING 
Scoring algorithm is implemented through the 
neural network. The architecture of the network 
is described in table 1 and a detailed design 
example of a network illustrated in table 2. 
Network design is based on Han and Kamber 
(2006). Implementation may be done using data 
mining software tool such as SAS business 
analytics software, or Weka.   
The network represents all parameters impacting 
on the vulnerable component comprising the 
input layer. Parameters include vulnerability 
characteristics as updated in NVD. 
Characteristic example parameters are 
vulnerability category, vulnerability severity, 
and parameters describing components' 
specification such as vendor name and product 
ID (such as operating system version). 
The input layer includes all CVSS parameter 
groups:  Basic metrics, Temporal and 
Environmental metrics. As illustrated in table 2 
parameters are categorized as they appear in 
CVSS. For example vulnerability access 
complexity includes three categories: high, 
medium and low.  
The hidden layers include a number of layers 
which represent messages from the exploited 
component to all other systems' components 
such as the operating systems in use, database, 
communication protocols used, UI programming 
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language, and all other application components 
called directly or indirectly by the vulnerable 
component. The neural network represents the 
logical workflow of messaging and data 
transfers between the component and all other 
systems' components. 
 
The output layer of the neural net represents 
losses occurring due to cyber attacks on 
components. Losses are categorized to low, 
medium, high and fatal. Losses represent actual 
business damages by past attacks on a 
component, as reported by the organization. 
Losses are reported on a regular basis until all 
late-effects are known, sometime in the future. 
This requires the nomination of a security person 
that would be responsible for regular reports of 
the vulnerabilities and damages. 
Neural net input signals are represented by zeros 
and ones according to the existence of the 
specific parameter. Messages between neural 
network nodes are binary. Arcs between nodes 
represent kinds of dependencies between 
components. Output layer categories are also 
binary.  
At the end of the process the system presents the 
predicted business loss category for attacks on 
one component. Each activation process of the 
network uses all computed weights between 
network nodes. The network may be 
programmed to predict attacks using a specific 
vulnerability or otherwise attacks using all 
vulnerabilities on that component. 
After prediction of the business losses, the 
organization decides ways of mediating the 
vulnerability, whether to accept the risk, try to 
attenuate the risk, wait for a patch or live 
without the risky component. 
 
The learning process is activated on a periodic 
basis generating updated weights to network 
arcs and components. The learning process is 
activated by three event types: (1) accepting 
indicators to a new vulnerability (2) Loss 
updates concerning past organizational losses (3) 
Changes performed to the computing 
configuration or environment. The training and 
learning process runs on the historical database 
of attacks by several forward and backward 
propagation processes until networks' 
termination conditions exist.  
 
The proposed approach differs from existing 
scoring models such as CVSS by dynamic 
generation of the calculations involved in the 
scoring process. CVSS uses fixed coefficients 
which were calculated at a specific point in the 
past. Our framework predicts losses on a 
continuous basis, and updates network 
coefficients through learning on a periodic (or 
nearly continuous) basis subject to operational 
constraints. 
 
Table 1 Neural Network architecture 
Input layer 
group 
Input layer 
parameter name 
Input layer 
parameters values                                                            
Intermediate 
layer                                             
Intermediate 
layer                                        
Output layer 
   Component UI 
protocol 
Component 
Operating system 
Business 
Losses 
 
      
Vulnerability 
Details 
Vendor 1 Cross site scripting    
 vendor 2 Untrusted search path HTML  Low 
( 1-10k) 
Basic 
Metrics 
Vul. Access 
Complexity 
Low    
  High    
    Windows 7  
     Medium  
(10k-100k) 
Temporal 
Metrics 
Vul.  
Exploitability 
High java   
  Functional    
      
    Unix  
Environmental 
Metrics 
Collateral damage 
potential 
High   High 
(100k-1000k) 
  Medium    
 
Table 2 Example of a Neural Network layer design 
 
 
 Input layer                                                             Intermediate 
layers                                                                                                  
   Output 
layer 
Input layer group Input layer 
parameter name 
Input layer 
param values                                                            
Component 
UI protocol
Component 
Operating 
system 
Database Application 
components 
Application 
components 
Business 
Losses 
 
         
Vulnerability 
Details 
Vulnerability 
Category 
Cross site 
scripting 
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  Buffer overflow HTML      
  SQL Injection       
 Vul. Vendor Red Hat  Windows 7  Com. x   
  Algosec       
  Quantum       
 Vul. Product ID 1234       
  3456  Unix     
 Vul. Severity High   Oracle    
  Medium     Com. 1  
  Low       
 Vul. start 
duration 
Less 1 week JAVA Windows 8     
  Less 1 month       
  Less 1 year       
  More 1 year       
Basic 
Metrics 
Vul. Access 
Complexity 
Medium    Comp y   
  High       
  Low       
 Vul. Access 
Vector 
Local      Medium  
(10k-
100k) 
  Adjacent       
  Network Javascript      
         
 Vul. Access Multiple  Windows XP   Com.  2  
 Authentication Single   DB2    
  None       
 Vul. 
Confidentiality 
Impact 
None       
  Partial       
  Complete       
 Vul. Integrity 
Impact 
 
None  Windows NT     
  Partial       
  Complete       
         
 Vul. Availability None AJAX      
  Partial       
  Complete       
    OS/360     
Temporal 
Mertics 
Vul.  
Exploitability 
Unproven   SQL    
  Proof of concept       
  Functional       
  High       
  Not Defined       
         
 Vul.  
Remediation  
Level 
Official Fix      High  
(100k-
1000k) 
  Temporary  Os X     
  Workaround       
  Unavailable       
  Not Defined       
         
 Report  
Confidence 
Unconfirmed .NET      
  Uncorroborated       
  Confirmed       
  Not Defined       
Environmental 
Metrics 
Collateral 
damage 
potential 
       
   C    Com.  3  
 
 
 Input layer                                                             Intermediate 
layers                                                                                                  
   Output 
layer 
Input layer group Input layer 
parameter name 
Input layer 
param values                                                            
Component 
UI protocol
Component 
Operating 
system 
Database Application 
components 
Application 
components 
Business 
Losses 
 
 Target 
component 
Distribution 
Low       
  Medium   SQL    
  High       
 Target CR  C++     Fatal  
(1000k - ) 
         
 Target IR      Com. 4  
    android  Comp w   
 Target AR        
         
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
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In this work we described a new framework of 
Security Continuous Monitoring (SCM) system 
and its mechanisms, including neural network 
architecture aimed at increasing security of 
information systems by improving and 
accelerating loss prediction. The system 
introduces four new capabilities: (1) Continuous 
real-time loss prediction software agent using 
real time environmental parameters for an 
improved loss prediction algorithm. (2) 
Components' interdependencies are used by a 
propagation algorithm for loss prediction, (3) 
Risk prediction is based on actual losses 
reported by the organization and (4) a learning 
algorithm which is based on a process of 
updating the facts concerning vulnerabilities' 
actual losses and real-time IT configuration.   
The framework enables getting improved 
recommendations to computer owners 
concerning new relevant vulnerabilities. The 
framework also enables improved security 
management of the operating systems. For 
example, in cases where a vulnerability to the 
new asset is publicly known but still un-patched, 
loading a new version of a software component 
will be prevented by performing a preliminary 
simulation test which analyzes vulnerabilities of 
the new component, incorporated in the 
operational environment.  
 
Several future research directions exist: 
performing a proof of concept of the framework 
for evaluation of the model, investigating 
defense methods against attack vectors involving 
several different vulnerabilities, searching new 
hidden vulnerabilities in a production 
environment. Further research could extend the 
resolution of the entities used in our model so 
that entities will include data items with the 
appropriate specifications such as security 
requirements, and interdependencies between 
components indicating data transfer between 
data items.  
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